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there are still manifestations of juror prejudice to be dealt with which need
study and "experimentation." It has been suggested that training for jury
service would help meet the problem of juror prejudice but even this suggestion
would only be meaningful as part of a comprehensive effort by the courts.7 7 The
element of communication also needs the consideration of the courts; for example
an "experiment" with written instructions might prove fruitful.7 8 In would seem
that there are possibilities for more productive experiments in the field of
criminal responsibility than that found in the instant case.
JAMES M.
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NoN-PAYMENT OF A FINE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF EXTENDED BEYOND MAXIMUM

STATUTORY SENTENCE

Subsequent to a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of assault in the third
degree, defendant Saffore was given the maximum sentence allowed by law: 1
a five hundred dollar fine in addition to imprisonment for one year. Nonpayment of the fine was to result in one day imprisonment for each dollar
remaining unpaid upon completion of the one year of incarceration. 2 It is
undisputed that the sentencing court was cognizant of the defendant's inability
to pay the fine: because of his indigency the trial court, the Appellate Division,
and the Court of Appeals granted the defendant's motion to have counsel
assigned to him. The effect of the complete sentence was to incarcerate
Saffore for at least eight months (assuming time off for good behavior) 8 plus
an additional five hundred days, for a crime for which the legislature had imposed a maximum one year term of imprisonment. The Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision 4 and an appeal was taken
by permission. The Court of Appeals held, when payment of a fine is "impossible" and known by the court to be "impossible," imprisonment to work
out the fine, if it results in total imprisonment of more than one year for a
misdemeanor, is unauthorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure and violates
the defendant's right to equal protection of the law and the constitutional ban
77. Arens 27.
78. Ibid.
1. N.Y. Pen. Law § 245 provides, "Assault in the third degree is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,

or both."

2. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 484, 718 provide "A judgment that the defendant pay a
fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied, specifying the extent
of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every one dollar of the fine."
3.

See N.Y. Correc. Law § 230.

4. People v. Saffore, 25 A.D.2d 496, 267 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1966).
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against excessive fines. People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
Providing substantial justice for all men regardless of financial standing
is an age-old problem. 5 At common law all misdemeanors were punishable by
fine and imprisonment as well as by corporal punishment and all felonies
0
except petit larceny, mayhem, and rape were punishable by death. Although
fines were often very large, sentences of imprisonment rarely exceeded the
term of two years.7 Common law rules prevailed in this country until the
ratification of the federal constitution.8 Today, in addition to state constitu0
9
tional provisions regarding excessive fines and equal protection,' the fourteenth amendment expressly mandates equal protection in the application of
both federal'" and state' 2 laws. The eighth amendment prohibits the imposition
of excessive fines by federal' 3 and state' 4 tribunals in criminal proceedings.
The Court in the instant case recognized the persuasiveness of the defendant's
arguments concerning the ever-increasing protections afforded the indigent by
the Supreme Court of the United States.' 5 Particularly since the case of
Griffin v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court has made measured advances toward
affording an indigent defendant equal protection of the laws before, during, and
after criminal proceedings. 17 In the Griffin case, Justice Black, speaking for a
majority of the Court, enunciated an enlarged standard of equal protection:
"In criminal trials, a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty
5. " e shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of

the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness thou shalt judge thy
neighbor." Leviticus 19:15.
6. See People ex rel. Gately v. Sage, 13 App. Div. 135, 43 N.Y. Supp. 372 (2d Dep't
1897).
7. Id. at 138, 43 N.Y. Supp. at 374.
8. For a general history of early fines and imprisonment, see 2 Holdsworth, A History
of English Law 43-44, 46 (3d ed. 1923).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. I, § 5 which provides, "Excessive bail shall not be
required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted.. ..
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. I, § 11 which provides, "No person shall be denied equal
protection of the laws .... "
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny .to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
12. Ibid.
13. U.S. Const. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
14. The eighth amendment has been held to be applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); United States
ex rel. Bryant v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852 (1963)
(cruel and unusual punishment clause); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964), and Pilkinton v. Circuit Ct., 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1963)
(excessive bail clause); United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (excessive fines clause assumed to be applicable).
15. Instant case at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 687-88, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (1966).
16. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
17. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (All persons must be notified of
right to counsel before police interrogations.); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (An
indigent may secure a free transcript of trial if such is necessary for appeal.); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (The absolute right to counsel at trial for major crimes
is afforded indigents.); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (Financial hurdles must not
impair the availability of a writ of habeas corpus.); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
(Nonpayment of a docket fee does not preclude appeal.).
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than on account of religion, race, or color."' 8 Although the statute involved"0
was both fair on its face and indiscriminatingly administered, it was held to
be both unreasonably discriminatory and in violation of equal protection because it led to one result for the wealthy and another for the poor. 20 Thus
Griffin was the genesis of explicit Supreme Court recognition of the fundamental
rights of the indigent accused under the equal protection standard. In a recent
district court case,2' however, the court recognized that the wide discretion
vested in the sentencing judge (considering, for example, the defendant's past
criminal records at the time of sentencing) precluded the invocation of the
eighth or fourteenth amendments in the case where neither a maximum fine
nor maximum imprisonment had been imposed upon an indigent.2 2 The imprisonment of a defendant for nonpayment of a fine when he is unable to pay
brings into play many of the basic protections implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution but only recently recognized by the judiciary. The basic problem
can be more easily analyzed by looking to the development of this area of the
law in New York State.
Early New York statutes provided that fines and imprisonment could be
levied against one who was convicted of a misdemeanor as well as upon a convicted felon.2 3 New York courts in the last century imposed imprisonment for
nonpayment upon defendants convicted of a misdemeanor for the purpose of
bringing about collection of a fine.24 Upon the adverse judgment a capias ad
satisfaciendum pro fine was issued to the sheriff to seize the convicted defendant
and detain him in jail for a period not to exceed one day for each unpaid dollar
of the fine.2 5 Yet as early as 1898 imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine was
deemed not to be criminal punishment but rather only a means compelling payment of the fine. 26 Even at this early date, however, there was considerable
confusion as to whether the trial judge in his discretion could levy a fine upon
an impecunious defendant for the purpose of increasing his jail term when
18. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1955).
19. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.65 (1955) (Sup. Ct. Rule
20. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1955) explains that,
pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's
could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."

65).
"Plainly the ability to
guilt or innocence and
Also, "There can be no

equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends upon the amount of money he has."
Id. at 19.
21. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.DN.Y. 1965).

22. Id. at 121. Instances in which the indigent defendant is sentenced and fined the
maximum allowed by law are expressly distinguished.
23. N.Y. Revised Laws of 1B13, ch. 29, § 13 (now various sections of N.Y. Pen.

Law).
24. See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203, 216 (1831): "It seems now to be well settled, that
for the collection of the fine imposed upon the defendant upon such conviction [of a
misdemeanor], the people have the right to proceed against the property of the defendant by

a levari faciw, as well as against the body; and perhaps they may proceed against both at
the same time."
25. People ex rel. Gately v. Sage, 13 App. Div. at 138, 43 N.Y. Supp. at 374 (2d Dep't
1897). This case contains a good review of early New York law on fine and imprisonment.
26. People v. Stock, 26 App. Div. 564, 50 N.Y. Supp. 483 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 197 N.Y.
681, 51 N.E. 1092 (1898).
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27
he thought the statutory punishment to be too lenient. Today, although some
28
states impose not only jail sentences for nonpayment but hard labor as well,
the sole rationale in New York State for imprisonment resulting from nonpayment of fines is that imprisonment is a means of collecting the fine and not an
increase in criminal penalty. 29 Both Congress and the New York State Legislature have recognized to a limited degree the inequities arising from the incarceration of an 'insolvent defendant. 30 Present statutory provisions, however,
do not solve the problem of determining the scope of the indigent's rights under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments: since constitutional rights, once recognized, are absolute, the determination of whether a defendant's rights have
been violated should not depend upon whether he serves one day or one year
3
or whether the fine imposed is one dollar or five hundred dollars. ' Moreover,
the constitutional implications of imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine have
32
not been recognized by New York State courts until recently, when two decisions held that imprisonment of an indigent for nonpayment of a fine was
unconstitutional.33 In People v. Johnson,3 4 Justice Hopkins explicitly stated that
confinement arising from default of payment of a fine by a known indigent
violated the defendant's rights under the equal protection clause of the four35

teenth amendment. The decision in People v. Collins

is much more explicit

in analyzing the constitutional implications of prior decisions. Although the
court in Collins rejected the defendant's contention that his imprisonment was

a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, it did
recognize the imprisonment as a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.80 The court stated that since the indigent does not have within
his control the power to free himself from incarceration he is placed in an un27. See People v. Kelly, 32 Misc. 319, 66 N.Y. Supp. 733 (Ct. Gen. Sess., N.Y. County
1900).
28. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 15, § 341 (1958); Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-7 (1953).
29. Matter of McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 26 NYE.2d 949 (1940); City of
Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 239 N.Y. Supp. 206 (4th Dep't 1930); People ex rel.
Wright v. Redman, 27 Misc. 2d 984, 209 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1960), appeal dismissed,
13 A.D.2d 620, 218 N.Y.S.2d 500 (4th Dep't 1961). But see Chapman v. Selover, 225 N.Y.
417, 421, 122 N.E. 206, 207 (1919), in which justice Cardozo says, "The state, when it
punishes misdemeanors by a fine, is not confined to the dubious remedy of a civil action
The offender who refuses to pay may be imprisoned until the fine is
for a penalty ....
satisfied... 2
30. See 18 US.C. § 3569 (1964) permitting one incarcerated for nonpayment of a
fine to obtain his release after thirty days upon sufficient showing of poverty; ALI Model
Penal Code § 302.2 (proposed final draft No. 1, 1961) providing for imprisonment in the event
of default only when a defendant has failed "to make a good faith effort to obtain the funds
required for the payment" or is otherwise contumacious; see also N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc.
§ 484 (power to remit fines).
31. See Brief for Respondent, p. 7, instant case.
32. See People v. Watson, 204 Misc. 467, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Ct. of Gen. Sess., N.Y.
County 1953).
33. See People v. Johnson, 24 A.D.2d 577, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1965); People
v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (County Ct., Orange County 1965).
34. People v. Johnson, supra note 33.
35. People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (County Ct., 1965).
36. Id. at 212, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
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equal position with the wealthy defendant whose conduct, trial, and punish37
ment have been the same.
In the instant case, the Court explicitly recognized that the only justification for imposing a jail sentence following nonpayment of a fine is that incarceration enforces payment of the fine and is not an increment to the maximum
statutory penalty.38 The imprisonment is, in other words, merely a means of
compelling obedience to the judgment of the court. 39 Thus, when the court
knows that the defendant cannot possibly pay the fine immediately, incarceration runs contrary to the spirit and intent of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure section 484, violates the defendant's right to equal protection of the
law, and is contrary to the constitutional ban against excessive fines. 40 In
enunciating this decision, Chief Judge Desmond, speaking for a unanimous
Court, defined an excessive fine as one "which notably exceeds in amount that
which is reasonable, usual, proper or just." 41 He explained that a fine of five
hundred dollars leived upon a man who has no money at all is necessarily excessive when it means that he will be jailed for a period longer than he otherwise
would for the crime, and will be deprived of the ability to earn a livelihood for
a period of five hundred days. 42 The Court also maintained that it is a denial
of equal protection of the laws to let a defendant's financial position determine
how long he must be imprisoned. The general rule of the case, then, requires
two exigencies: first, that the court recognize the actual indigency of the defendant; second, that imprisonment under the sentence result in more than one
year for a misdemeanor. Such determinations by any New York court must
necessarily prohibit the immediate imprisonment of an indigent for nonpayment
of a fine.
It has been said that "equal criminal justice for the rich and poor alike
is one of the few areas where our country follows rather than leads."' 3 Since the
case of Griffin v. Illinois,44 attainment of substantial criminal justice regardless
of economic disparities has been a major goal of the courts. The decision in the
instant case may be said to be one step in this direction. Yet it is arguable that
the Court of Appeals decision fails to give clear guidelines for the determination
of future cases. For example: Is the very imposition of a fine upon a known
37. It should be noted that the facts in the Collins case are strikingly similar to those in
the instant case and the court in Collins did not relieve an indigent from paying the fine.
In effect, the court realized that this would put the wealthy person in a worse position
than .the indigent and would be a further violation of equal protection and due process. Ibid.
38. Instant case at 103, 218 N.E.2d at 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
39. See also McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. at 397-98, 26 N.E.2d at 951 (1940);
City of Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 239 N.Y. Supp. 206 (4th Dep't 1930).
40. Instant case at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 687, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 974: "Since imprisonment

for nonpayment of a fine can validly be used only as a method of collection for refusal to
pay a fine we should now hold that it is illegal so to imprison a defendant who is financially
unable to pay."
41. Instant case at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
42. Chief Judge Desmond also stresses the absurdity of serving out a fine at the rate of
one dollar per 24 hours in a state where the minimum wage is $1.50 per hour.
43. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 205, 224 (1964).
44. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
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indigent a violation of his constitutional rights per se? Perhaps the imposition of
a fine upon an indigent by itself is not unconstitutional, but only becomes such
in the absence of giving the indigent a reasonable opportunity to bring about its
payment. In accordance with the notions of due process and the protection
against excessive fines, the instant Court recognized the constitutional demands
for "reasonable, usual, proper, or just" punishment. 45 It would seem that if
an indigent defendant is afforded no opportunity to bring about payment of the
fine, imprisonment for nonpayment is unreasonable, unfair, and unjust. A fine
may be termed "excessive" only in terms of the indigent's ability to pay. Moreover, if an indigent is not given the opportunity to comply with the judgment
of the court and is subsequently imprisoned for a period longer than the maximum allowed by statute, a fine imposed upon him denies equal protection because blatant discrimination exists between the wealthy man and the poor man.
Accordingly, the "impossibility" of payment recognized by the Court can exist
only when immediate payment is demanded from the indigent or when the
indigent will under no circumstances ever be able to bring about payment.
If the reasonableness of a fine is based upon a "choice" 4 6 of freedom or
imprisonment because of economic means, consider the comparison between the
wealthy man and the indigent. The indigent has no choice with regard to immediate payment. It may be argued, therefore, that imprisonment of an indigent
defendant is justified to prevent his eluding without pain the penalty a nonindigent suffers in paying a fine: the penalties, although different in form, are
equal in burden. However, no one would contend that imprisonment at the rate
of one day of imprisonment for each unpaid dollar falls with equal severity upon
the indigent as the fine of five hundred dollars upon the man of means.47 The
decision in the instant case does not preclude terms of reasonable payment imposed by the judge in accordance with probation proceedings. 48 It is suggested,
then, that the rule in the instant case is based upon the indigent's ability to
pay the fine under reasonable circumstances and does not prohibit all impositions of fines upon indigents nor all imprisonment resulting from nonpayment.
If the indigent were given a reasonable period to pay the fine, subsequent
failure to pay could result in further proceedings against the defendant 49 and
45. Instant case at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
46. Goldberg, supra note 43, at 221 states, "The 'choice' of paying $100 fine or spending
30 days in jail is really no choice at all to the person who cannot raise $100. The resulting
imprisonment is no more or no less than imprisonment for being poor, a doctrine which I
trust this Nation has long since outgrown."
47. See Brief for Appellant, p. 11, instant case, arguing that in terms of due process this
sentence "has a kind of vice that is unlawful for a rich man as well as for a poor man. It
condemns a person to imprisonment for a- period outlasting the maximum time authorized
by law unless the prisoner fulfills an impossible condition."
48. See, e.g., N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 932 (A court may impose as a condition of
probation that a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor "shall work faithfully at suitable employment" and "shall pay a fine in one or several sums.") and § 935 (power to jail defendant
for violation of probation).
49. Perhaps contempt proceedings. Compare N.Y. Court Acts, Part I, Support Proceedings § 454 (commitment for nonpayment).
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would not be in violation of either the eighth or the fourteenth amendments.5 0
By comparing what it costs the state to imprison a defendant with the dollar
amount of the fine collected through this remedy, some states, recognizing the
best interests of the state and the defendant, have provided for installment payments in lieu of incarceration.5 l Provisions in the new New York Revised Penal
Law, however, do not adopt the "reasonable terms of payment" rationale, but
provide for the imposition of fines for a misdemeanor as a deterrent and as a
52
sanction.

Serious problems may arise in extension of the rationale of the present
Court to other fact situations, e.g., violation of an ordinance.53 The Court's rationale could logically be extended to prohibit the imprisonment of a person who
violated an ordinance and subsequently was unable to pay the fine. In a recent
Wisconsin case,54 however, imprisonment for failure to pay a fine imposed for
violation of ordinance was held constitutional. Although the court expressly
recognized such indigency arguments as were presented in the instant case, 5
it did not refute the efficacy of these arguments. The court held that to adopt
such line of reasoning would be to vitiate all fines of ordinance violators who
could be considered "indigent," and would allow such offenders to violate city
ordinances with impunity. 6 This reasoning overlooks the installment payment
possibilities and the attendant contempt proceedings for violation thereof. It is
persuasive to suggest, then, that the way to assure that an indigent will pay a
fine is not to incarcerate him but rather to permit him the opportunity to earn
money to pay it.57 Finally, although it is said that the government cannot be
expected to equalize all economic disparities, this does not mean that it should
not try to equalize such disparities in certain critical areas like criminal justice:
"The real question is . . . 'has the government done all that can be reasonably
required of it ... to render the poverty of the litigant an irrelevancy?' In all

candor we must confess that government in this country-both state and federalhas not done all that can reasonably be required."5'8 The instant case is a step
in the right direction.
DAVID

R.
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50. A further analogy may be made to support proceedings. Courts maintain records
of reasonable and steady payments. See, e.g., N.Y. Court Acts, Part I, Support Proceedings,
§§ 412-14 (duty of payment) and 224 (collection of money).
51. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1205; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 953 (1964).
52. See N.Y. Revised Pen. Law, Commission Staff Comments on Changes in the New
Pen. Law Since the 1964 Study Bill, art. 80. The same comments, however, recognize that
fines levied upon felons must bear a reasonable relation to the perpetrated crime.
53. See, e.g., Buffalo, N.Y., Ordinances ch. IX, § 30 (1952) (disorderly conduct), which
provides "and in case the person so convicted does not immediately pay such fine, he or she
may be committed to the Erie County penitentiary for the term of one day for each and
every dollar of such fine not paid." (Emphasig added.).
54. City of Milwaukee v. Horvath, 143 N.W.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1966).
55. Id. at 448.
56. Ibid.
57. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 47.
58. Goldberg, supra note 43, at 224.

